Dollars, deficits, and the international monetary system by anonymous
THE U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, according to
most of the commonly used definitions, has reached
record magnitudes in the past two years. Within the
last several months, the persistence of large deficits
has aroused sharp controversy both in official and
private circles. For example, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS), in its latcst Annual Report,
commented in the following manner on the U.S.
balance-of-payments situation:~
Apart from technical measures to contain the
outflow of funds, the Administration had no plans
for curing the U.S. payments deficit. The Council
of Economic Advisers declared in its Annual Re-
port that unilateral policy action by the United
States cannot eliminate the deficit so long as other
countries insist on running surpluses over and above
their SDR allocations. This attitude seems rather
far removed from the spirit — and the letter — of
the Bretton Woods system, which SDRs are sup-
posed to be preserving.
This brief statement touches certain sensitive areas
of international monetary relations that are currently
receiving considerable attention. First, and most ur-
gent, are the problems of foreign countries, and in
particular their central banks, in dealing with a huge
influx of dollars. This large flow of dollars is partially
a result of the reduction in U.S. borrowings from the
Eurodollar market, and of the decline of interest rates
in the United States,2 In addition, a “multiple expan-
sion” of Eurodollars occurred as European central
banks placed dollar balances with the BIS. Second,
the balance-of-payments deficit of the United States
is being reappraised in light of the policies of the
Administration and in view of the prospects for fin-
provement in the U.S. balance-of-payments position.
Third, there is a new sense of urgency in thc search
for alternatives to the continued accumulation of dol-
lars by foreigners, especially central banks. One pos-
sible solution, which has not received full considera-
tion, calls for a U.S. policy of stable noninflationary
monetary growth. These issues will be examined at
length in this article.
Bank for Internafional Settlements, Forty-first Annual Report,
(Basel, 1971), p. 20.
2
For an illuminating analysis of the Eurodollar market, see the
immediately following article by Professor Milton Friedman,
‘The Eurodollar Market: Some First Principles,” reprinted
by permission from the Morgan Guaranty Survey, October
1969.
As is generally the case in international monetary
policy matters, these difficulties have little likelihood
of quick resolution, although Germany and the Neth-
erlands have attempted to meet their immediate
dollar inflow problems by allo\ving their currencies
to float. Austria and Switzerland have revalued their
currencies.3 The following article reviews recent is-
sues and developments in international monetary
affairs, and discusses some proposed measures to im-
prove conditions.
Europe’s Dollar Problem
U.S. Interest Rates and
Short-term Capital Flows
Private foreigners have accumulated large amounts
of dollars to hold as liquid assets and as a medium
of exchange for world trade. Many foreigners have
chosen to hold these liquid dollar balances as deposits
in European banks (Eurodollars) rather than as di-
rect deposits in U.S. banks. Extremely high Euro-
dollar interest rates encouraged private foreigners to
channel currently accruing dollar receipts into Euro-
dollar deposits, especially in 1968 and 1969. Private
foreigners also converted their domestic currencies
into dollars for the same purpose. Foreign central
banks, obligated to maintain fixed exchange rates,
supplied these dollars by drawing down their official
reserve holdings of dollars, and even sold $1 billion
of gold to the United States in order to obtain dollars
in 1969. In addition, central banks themselves have
been attracted by high interest yields, and have lent
funds in the Eurodollar market through the Bank
for International Settlements, which acted as an
intermediary.
in large measure, thc upward pressure on Euro-
dollar interest rates was transmitted by U.S. banks
borrowing on a “nondeposit” basis in the Eurodollar
market. Eurodollar interest ratcs normally rise and
fall with U.5. short-term rates. In 1968 and 1969,
Eurodollar rates were also pushed up, as U.S. banks
sought to find alternative sources of cash. The rise in
U.S. short-term rates above existing interest rate ceil-
ings had made it extremely difficult for banks to raise
funds through the sale of negotiable CDs, With the
~A country that revalues raises the price, in terms of foreign
currency, at which it buys or sells its own currency. A
counfry that devalues does the opposite.
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decline in U.S. interest rates that began in early 1970,
and the removal of interest ceilings on large 30- to
89-day maturity COs in June 1970, U.S. banks once
more were able to issue CDs at attractive rates, and
Three Month Eurodollar lending Rate ‘
‘Three Month Certificate of Deposit
Primary Mthet Rate ~
Adiusted for Reserve Requirements
*





Eurodollar Holdings of U.S. Banks
no longer found it profitable to compete for reserves
in the Eurodollar market. The accompanying chart
shows how the volume of CDs and Eurodollar bor-
rowings of U.S. banks have fluctuated in response to
CD interest rate ceilings and relative interest costs of
obtaining funds in the two competing channels. As
Eurodollar borrowings by U.S. banks were repaid,
interest rates on Eurodollars declined sharply. Private
foreigners then sought more attractive returns in do-
mestic European money markets, and converted dol-
lars back into European currencies through foreign
central banks.
The Mark-Dollar “Crisis”
In West Germany, where the Bundesbank at-
tempted to cool inflationary pressures by following a
restrictive monetary policy, domestic interest rates
were above Eurodollar interest rates by mid-1970,
contrary to previous years. This induced German
companies, which have free access to the Eurodollar
market, to borrow funds from it, converting the dollar
proceeds into marks. Multinational corporations and
other investors were likewise encouraged to exchange
dollars for marks which could earn attractive yields
when placed on deposit in German banks or lent in
German money markets. The following chart shows
how German banks and enterprises increased their
net foreign liabilities sharply in 1970, as Eurodollar
interest rates fell below domestic German rates.
As a result, the Bundesbank was obliged to pur-
chase approximately 3 billion dollars between Jan-
uary and April in support of the official mark-
dollar parity. The Bundesbank’s dollar reserves grew,
increasing expectations that official action would be
taken to stem the inflow by adjusting upward the
value of the mark. Conversion of dollars into marks
by those in position to speculate on exchange rates
then swelled the German central bank’s dollar re-
serves even further, especially after official support of
the dollar in forward exchange markets was sus-
pended on April 28.
In just two days, before the foreign-exchange mar-
kets were temporarily closed on May 5, the Bundes-
bank was forced to acquire an additional 2 billion
dollars in order to maintain parity on the “spot”
exchange market.4 Finally, on May 10, the decision
was announced that official dollar-mark convertibility
~The spot exchange market involves trading of currencies for
current delivery. Trading of currencies for future delivery
is conducted in “forward” exchange markets. For an exposi-
tion of these terms, see Alchian and Allen, University
Economics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967),
pp. 686-690, 753-760.
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sary or unwise. Some reports suggest the mark might
be permitted to float for as long as six months or
more until speculative sentiment wanes, after which
the old parity might be restored, Recent accumula-
tions of dollars due to short-term capital inflows are
assumed by some officials to be temporary and revers-
ible. The recent rise in Eurodollar lending rates may
reduce the incentive for Germans to borrow
Eurodollars.
Opposition to a revaluation of the mark stems from
several industries, including German exporters of au-
tomobiles and machinery and import-competing in-
dustries, such as textiles, chemicals and electrical
equipment. Revaluation of the mark by nine per cent
in 1969 is still fresh in mind, and further appreciation
might hurt the international competitive position of
some German goods. Subsidized German agriculture,
whose price support levels are geared to dollar
equivalents under the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) Common Agricultural Policy, stood to re-
ceive lower prices and incomes until assured that
compensating adjustments in support levels and sub-
sidies would be made.
at 27.3 cents per mark was suspended for an indefinite
period. Since then, the dollar price of the mark has
fluctuated in the free market at a spot price ranging
from two to five per cent above the old parity. Per-
mitting the mark to float reduced the incentive for
speculative conversion of dollars into marks.
German officials are apparently not unanimously
agreed that an early revaluation is out of the ques-
tion. Although a sharp improvement has occurred in
1971, some German officials point to their 1968-1970
balance-of-payments deficits (“basic balance”) as evi-
dence that a mark revaluation may be either unneces-
Short-term Capital Flows and
Monetary Stabilization
One of the advantages claimed for fixed exchange
rates and free convertibility among currencies is that
they tend to promote close international linkages
among markets, These linkages pose certain monetary
control problems, however. The mobility of short-
term capital, in response to interest rate differentials
among countries, diminishes the leverage of foreign
central banks in pursuing independent domestic mon-
etary policies. Inflows of dollars into a given country
tend to expand its monetary base, leading to faster
growth in domestic money supply, easier credit con-
ditions in the short run, and when resources become
fully employed, to inflation and ultimately higher in-
terest rates.
A monetary authority that seeks to prevent this
must either discourage the inflow of dollars or offset
the impact of the inflow on the domestic money
supply through restrictive policies. But efforts to dis-
courage the inflow of dollars may involve exchange
controls and other interferences with markets. Res1tric~
tive monetary policies that temporarily result in
higher domestic interest rates may actually tend to
increase the inflow of dollars seeking short-term in-
vestment. Moreover, if the inflows are due, in part, to
a favorable balance of trade, restrictive monetary
policies will postpone, rather than hasten, the reduc-
Page 5When a Eurodollar Becomes a
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tion of exports relative to imports that would be re-
quired to restore balanee- f-payments equilibrium.
Among the more frequently used methods for dis-
couraging dollar inflows are: (a) central bank opera-
tions (frequently on a preferential basis with domestic
commercial banks) to drive the price of the dollar
upward in forward exchange markets so as to increase
the “covered interest” rates on Eurodollar loans rela-
tive to interest rates on domestic loans; (b) reduction
of central bank discount rates for the same purpose;
(e) wohihition of interest payments to foreign own-
ers of domestic bank deposits; (d) raising reserve
requirements on such deposits; (e) exchange con-
trols to limit the conversion of dollars into “resident”
domestic currency; (f) capital restraints on the
amount of foreign borrowing by domestic banks, other
financial institutions and business firms; (g) lowering
of tariffs and other barriers to imports; and (h) re-
luxation of restrictions on foreign investment by do-
mestic individuals and companies.5
During the recent dollar-mark “crisis,” West Ger-
many, in order to discourage capital inflows, dis-
continued its operations in the forward exchange
market, lowered its bank rate from seven and one-
half to five per cent, and stopped interest payments
and doubled reserve requirements on foreign-owned
bank deposits. Until now, West Germany has avoided
direct controls of type (e) and (f), but the British
Treasury recently prohibited additional short-term
Eurodollar borrowing by British companies for do-
mestic use.
The Japanese, who are currently running a balance-
of-payments surplus, have maintained an extensive
system of exchange controls to discourage short-term
inflows of dollars. Opposition to yen revaluation is
strong, so other measures to alleviate upward pres-
sure are being adopted. Recently, the Japanese gov-
ernment announced an eight-point program that in-
cludes lower import barriers and complete liberaliza-
tion of foreign investment by Japanese citizens and
firms. Other actions have included lowering the cen-
tral bank discount rate, relaxing controls on private
ownership of dollars, and subsidizing banks desiring
forward coveron dollar holdings.
Attempts to stem the flow of dollars into and out of
central bank reserves have generally been ineffective
or insufficiently vigorous. Therefore, in order to neu-
tralize the effects of these movements on domestic
spending, a somewhat different set of tactics has
sometimes been adopted. To limit expansion of the
5
George W. McKenzie, “International Monetary Reform and
the ‘Crawling Peg,’” this Review (February 1969), pp. 15-23,
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domestic monetary base, some central banks have, on
occasion adjusted discount rates upward liquidated
their holdings of government seeunties and raised
commercial h ink reserxe requirements Governments
have sometimes increased their deposits at central
banks The leading practitioner of this general ap
proach to dealing with recent dollar inflows has been
France. The rates on loans and discounts at the
Bank of France have been raised, taxes have been
placed on bank deposits of foreigners, and reserve
requirements have been increased. In West Germany,
reserve requirements have been raised across the
board on domestic bank deposits by 15 per cent.
The Bundsbank in the past has been able to neutral
ize a high proportion of the changes in its foreign
rcserxs through offsetting adjustments of the do
mestic sourecso fthe monetary base
Governments at times have also raised taxes in
eieised thur borroxving or undertaken other fiscal
jetions in support of these efforts The German Fed
ual budget for 1971 and commitments for funding
future spending progiams each have been cut by one
billion marks
If a country desires to maintain a fixed exchange
rate and finds it cannot prevent the accumulation
of foreign exchange reserves or offset their effect on
the domestic nionetary stock then the ultimate ad-
justment must be through changes in aggregate do
mestic demand prices and inteiest iates There is
evidence that this has occurred in a number of in-
stances. As world short-term capital markets become
more closely linked, through the Eurodollar market
and other transmission mechanisms, surplus and defi-
cit countries will have less latitude to postpone these
ultimate balance-of-payments adjustments. The pres-
ent international system imposes a discipline on each
country to foster a domestic price trend at a rate that,
in the long run, is roughly consistent yvith the average
for all trading nations. To some foreigners it appears
more and more that this long-i-un average will be
determined by the United States.
The Eurodollar market has been blamed for ac-
centuating the problems of central banks by increas-
ing the mobility of short-term funds. There is reason
6
Manfred Willms, “Controlling Money in an Open Economy:
The German Case,” this Review (April 1971), pp. 10-27. In
1969 and again this year, however, when the extremely
large size of the inflows was due in part to speculation on
revaluation, German monetary authorities made exchange
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to believe, however, that these problems may have
been aggravated partly by some of the central banks’
own actions. As Table I indicates, in December 1970,
recorded foreign exchange assets of central banks
were $13.4 bfflion greater than dollar and sterling
liabilities to foreign central banks, as recorded by
the United States and England. No less than $6 bffiion
of this discrepancy appeared in 1970 alone. Since the
bulk of official foreign exchange reserves are dollars,
and most of the remainder is sterling, the discrep-
ancy has been attributed toa kind of “multiple count-
ing” of dollar claims on the United States which arises
out of central bank lending in the Eurodollar market.
Attracted by high yields on Eurodollars, a number
of foreign central banks deposited dollars with the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), which in
turn redeposited these funds with Eurobanks.7 After
Eurobanks lent these deposited funds, some borrowers
exchanged the dollar proceeds of the loans for foreign
currencies obtained from central banks. The dollars
that foreign central banks originally placed with the
BIS became the basis for creation of ne\v Eurodollars,
some of which were acquired by central banks. In-
stead of counting as reserves only those dollars which
are liabilities of the United States, the central banks
counted some created liabilities of Eurobanks as well.
From the point of vie\v of reconciling official cen-
tral bank records of assets and liabilities, it is as if
foreign central banks counted some of their true dol-
lar claims on the United States twice (or possibly
more times, in the case of Eurobank created dollars
that were again fed back into the Eurodollar market).
Unless offset by other actions, when these Euro-
dollars were converted into domestic currencies, for-
eign central banks would increase their domestic
money supplies. There is little doubt that the willing-
ness of central banks to supply funds to the Euro-
dollar market supported multiple expansion of Euro-
dollar deposits. It may also have kept Eurodollar in-
terest rates lower than they otherwise would have
been.
Realization of the extent to which Eurodollars have
been recycled in this manner is very recent. Some
estimates suggest that at least $5 billion of foreign
official dollar reserves have been generated in this
way.8 The BIS has confirmed the intention of central
7
Eurobanks are banks located outside the United States
(including foreign branches of U.S. banks) which accept
deposit liabilities denominated in dollars.
T
Fritr Machlnp, “The Magicians and Their Rabbits,” Morgan
Gnaranty Survey (May 1971), pp. 3-13,
Table I
INTERNATIONAL LIQUIDITY
(8:11 ‘on s of Do~l an I
1960 1965 1961 1969 1970
Liquid Assets Recorded by Central Banks
Gold $38.0 541.9 539.5 539.! 537 2
SDRs —- -. — —— 3.1
IME Reserve Position 3.6 5.4 5.7 6.7 7.7
Foreign Exchange Assets 1 8.6 23.6 28.9 31.9 43.9
rotc! Reserve Anne’s 60.2 70.9 74.1 777 91.9
Liabilities to Official Foreigners Recorded by
Central Banks of Reserve Currency Countries
U.S. Dollar liabilities 11.1 15.8 18.3 16.0 23.9
U.K. Sterling Liabilities 7.1 7.1 8.3 8.9 6.6
Total Dollar and Sterling
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banks to withdraw lunds Irom the Eurodollar market
“when such action is prudent in the light of market
conditions.” Quick withdrawal of funds might drive
Eurodollar rates up, causing contraction of the Euro-
dollar borrowing.
It is not surprising in light of these discoveries that
many international monetary officials are now calling
for regulations on Eurodollar banking. There has
been conjecture about imposing reserve requirements
on Eurodollar deposits. Unless these are made uni-
form and universal, opposition may be forthcoming,
particularly from the British. About half of such Euro-
banking is conducted in London, and uneven applica-
tion of regulations might result in loss of some of this
market to other countries.
U.S. Balance of Payments
Balance-of-Payments Policies
The recent upheaval in foreign exchange markets
disturbed a calm that had prevailed over the inter-
national financial system since the 1969 mark revalua-
tion. Except for strong disapproval of the use of
exchange rate adjustments as an instrument of short-
run domestic cyclical control,9 responses to the cur-
rent mark-dollar crisis among U.S. officials have been
°Speech by Arthur Burns, Chairman, Board of Covemnors of
the Federal Reserve System, before the Intemational Bank-
tag Conference, Munich, May 28, 1971.
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restrained. Administration spokesmen have acknowl-
edged a concern over controlling the size of the
“basic” balance-of-payments deficit,’° which specifi-
cally excludes short-term dollar flows that have been
the source of recent unrest. Some foreign observers
have been prompted to accuse the present Admin-
istration of pursuing a policy of “benign neglect”
toward its balance-of-payments deficits.1’ While U.S.
international monetary policy has not been materially
modified in the light of recent events, it is incorrect
to describe the United States as responding com-
pletely passively to the build-up of dollars in official
foreign hands.
Last December, the Federal Reserve attempted to
encourage banks to maintain their Eurodollar “re-
serve free base” liabilities by raising reserve require-
ments on liabilities in excess of this base from 10 per
cent to 20 per cent. In an effort to push up Euro-
dollar interest rates relative to rates in other foreign
money markets, the Export-Import Bank between
January and April borrowed $3 billion from foreign
branches of U.S. banks. The U.S. Government paid
almost a two percentage point premium for such
funds over comparable U.S. short-term interest rates.
According to Federal Reserve Governor Dewey Daane,
the Federal Reserve and the Treasury also undertook
a mild revival of “operation twist,” emphasizing pur-
chase of coupon issues to restrain long-term rates
from rising while issuing short-tenn debt to exert up-
ward pressure on short-term rates.12 As a further
step, announced in June, the Treasury would ex-
change $5 billion of short-term Treasury securities
held by the German Bundesbank for higher yielding
medium-term securities.
Beyond this, the reaction of some officials to foreign
criticism that more should be done has been to em-
phasize that by reducing inflationary pressures, the
restrictive monetary policies of 1969 and early 1970
‘°Speechby Paul A. Volcker, Under Secretary of the Treasury,
before the joint meeting of the American Economic, Finance,
and Statistical Associations, Detroit, December 29, 1970. The
“basic” balance is the sum of: (a) the current account
balance; (b) the balance on long-term U.S. and foreign
private capital; and (c) the balance of U.S. and foreign
govennuent capital other than changes in U.S. and foreign
official reserve holdings.
“A policy of “benign neglect” by the U.S. of its balance-of-
payments deficits has been advocated in two recent articles:
Cottfried Haberler and Thomas D. Willett, A Strategy for
U.S. Balance of Payments Policy, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (February, 1971), and
Lawrence B. Krause, “A Passive Balance-of-Payments Strat-
egy for the United States,” Brookiags Papers on Economic
Activity, Volume 3, 1970.
l
2
5peech by Dewey Daane, Member of the Board of Coy-
emors, Federal Reserve System, before the Bankers As-
sociation for Foreign Trade, Boca Baton, Florida, April
27, 1971.
have, in fact, contributed to improved international
stability. Continuance of tight money, it is felt, not
only might weaken the U.S. economy, but depress
our demand for imported goods to the point of
plunging the rest of the world into serious economic
contraction. The Vice-President of the United States
expressed it bluntly when he said, “We will not .-
put the United States through the wringer in order to
deal with a temporary situation.”3 Ironically, the
recent low interest rates, of which Europeans com-
plained, were substantially the result of previous tight
U.S. monetary policies, which led to a weakening in
demand for credit.
There seems to be an inclination of U.S. policy-
makers to assign to other countries some of the re-
sponsibility for our balance-of-payments deficits. The
United States, it is maintained, cannot succeed in
reducing its payments deficits if other countries are
determined to follow policies that enable them to
have surpluses. Chairman Arthur Burns of the Fed-
eral Reserve has called upon foreign countries to relax
their import restraints and capital investment controls,
and to use fiscal policy more actively in domestic
stabilization, Citing the excessively stringent mone-
tary policies conducted by European countries in the
past year, Dr. Burns advised these countries to co-
ordinate their monetary policies more closely with the
requirements for stabilization of international short-
term capital flows.’4 Proposals that the United States
arrange somehow to devalue the dollar with respect
to other major currencies have made little headway.
Administration leaders have, in turn, suggested that
some foreign currencies may be undervalued.’8
The U.S.Balance of Payments in Retrospect
The U.S. balance of payments (on a liquidity basis)
has been in deficit in all but two years since 1950 —
the year the Korean War began and one year after
most major currencies underwent major devaluations
with respect to the dollar. Until the last three years
of the Eisenhower administration, these deficits were
generally small and aroused no great concern among
l
3
5peech by Vice President Spiro Agnew, before the Business
Council, Hot Springs, Virginia, May 8, 1971, as reported
in the Wall Street Journal (~vIay10, 1971).
“Testimony by Arthur Burns before the Senate Bankin
Committee, May 19, 1971, as reported in the New Yor
Journal of Commerce (May 20, 1971).
‘
5
Testimony by John Connally, Secretary of the Treasury,
before the Senate Finance Subcommittee, May 17, 1971,
as reported in the New York Journal of Commerce (May
20, 1971). Also see Annual Report of the Council of
Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President,
1971, p. 152.
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policymakers. By 1959, however, our balance of pay-
ments had become a problem that called for, and
received, corrective treatment in the form of a restric-
tive monetary policy. In the wake of the 1960-61
recession, the economy operated below capacity for
several years. Inflation, which had accelerated be-
tween 1955 and 1958, was brought under control.
Wholesale prices, for example, did not increase at all
between 1960 and 1964, compared with a 1.9 per cent
average increase for the other major industrial coun-
tries. Along with this improved price performance
came somewhat reduced balance-of-payments deficits,
largely because our exports expanded faster than
our imports. In 1964 the current account balance
reached a surplus of $5.8 billion, the highest it had
been since 1947.
The benefits of monetary restraint during the late
1950’s and early 1960’s were not fully reflected in the
balance of payments, owing to increasingly large out-
flows on long-term capital account. Long-term net U.S.
foreign investment exceeded $4 billion in both 1964
and 1965 and had risen steadily from $1.6 billion in
1959. Direct and portfolio investment in the Common
Market countries of Europe was largely responsible
for this increase. Congress enacted the interest equali-
zation tax in 1964 to discourage borrowing by foreign
corporations in U.S. money markets. Restrictions
on foreign lending were imposed on banks and
other financial institutions in 1965. Voluntary con-
trols on direct investment abroad by American
corporations were imposed in 1965 and made manda-
tory in 1968.
While the capital controls program served to reduce
the outflow of long-term funds in the latter half of
the 1960’s, the U.S. current account surplus began
to shrink after 1964. By 1968 it had become a deficit
of $0.4 billion. Again, relative trends of prices at
home and abroad had a telling impact. Expansive
monetary policies created substantial inflation in the
United States beginning in 1965. U.S. wholesale prices
advanced at 2 per cent annually between 1964 and
1968, compared with 1.4 per cent for other industrial
countries. The increase in direct U.S. overseas military
expenditures from $2.9 billion in 1964 to $4.5 billion
in 1968 was another factor contributing to the smaller
balance on current account. Between 1968 and 1970,
however, wholesale prices in other major countries
increased more rapidly than corresponding U.S. prices
(4.2 versus 3.2 per cent, respectively); the U.S. bal-
ance of payments on current account showed only
slight further weakening in 1969 and improved in
1970.
Capital flows became the dominant factor causing
changes in our balance-of-payments position during
1969 and 1970. Increased net outflows on long-term
capital account contributed $1 billion of the $1.5 bil-
lion increase in the “basic” balance-of-payments deficit
in 1969. Our “net liquidity” deficit rose in 1969 to $6.1
billion from $1.6 billion the previous year. Most of
this change could be accounted for by: (a) imper-
fections in the balance-of-payments statistics related
to transfers of deposits to Eurobanks;’° (b) reduc-
tion in purchases of U.S. stocks and bonds by private
foreigners; and (c) lessened growth in non-liquid
short-term foreign borrowing by U.S. businesses. The
“official settlements” balance, which reflects changes
in foreign official net dollar claims, showed a surplus
of $2.7 billion in 1969, mainly because private for-
eigners, seeking high interest returns available on
Eurodollars, converted their domestic currencies into
dollars at foreign central banks, thus causing a de-
crease in official foreign holdings of dollars,
With the decline in U.S. interest rates in 1970,
unrecorded transfers of deposits to the Eurodollar
market by U.S. individuals dropped sharply. This,
plus the initial SDR allocation to the U.S., combined
to cut the net liquidity deficit to $3.9 billion. Improve-
ment in the current account balance was offset by an
increase in our deficit on long-term capital account,
so that the “basic” balance-of-payments deficit was
slightly larger in 1970. The fall in U.S. interest rates
brought about a decline in Eurodollar interest rates,
which led to a huge conversion of dollars into local
currencies by private foreigners. As liquid dollar
holdings of foreigners were shifted from private to
official hands, the official settlements deficit reached
$9.8 billion, compared with a surplus in the previous
year.
Short-Run Prospects
Expansion of the domestic economy at a pace
faster than foreign economic expansion tends to carry
with it an increase in demand for imports relative to
exports, and a deterioration of the balance of pay-
ments on current account. Consequently, a weaken-
ing of our balance of payments might seem to be in
prospect, as the U.S. economy recovers from the
1969-70 recession. U.S. imports may be stimulated by
rising domestic incomes, Our excess of exports over
imports, after reaching a seasonally adjusted annual
‘°Asubstantial volume of deposits transferred by Americans
from U.S. banks to foreign branches were not recorded
as increasing our liquid assets, but the simultaneous borrow-
ing of these funds by U.S. banks from their foreign branches
was recorded asincreasing our liquid liabilities.
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rate of $2.7 billion in the first three quarters of 1970,
shifted to one-quarter of this rate in the six months
ended March 1971.
Although this smaller trade surplus is traceable
mainly to rapid expansion of imports relative to ex-
ports, there are disturbing signs that demand for our
exports may deteriorate because a number of im-
portant trading nations are now encountering eco-
nomic slowdown. Industrial production indexes for
France, Italy, and Germany have levelled off since
the second quarter of 1970, while Japan’s industrial
gro\vth began to decelerate in the fourth quarter.
Unemployment has increased in all of these countries
since 1969. British industrial production has been
moving erratically upward, but unemployment re-
mains relatively high. In the year ended fourth quar-
ter 1970, wholesale prices in the United States rose
2.8 per cent, compared with 4.5 per cent in other
major industrial countries. However, with a business
expansion underway in the United States and eco-
nomic slowdoxvn occurring in other major trading
countries, the forces that recently have moved the
relative price trend in our favor may not continue.
Upward adjustment of the value of the mark (float-
ing), guilder (floating), Austrian schilling (revalued
5.05 per cent), and Swiss franc (revalued 7.07 per
cent) will help, but very little. The effect of adjust-
ments made so far would be to reduce the relative
prices of American goods and services in world mar-
kets by \vell under one per cent on average.
This emphasis on imports and exports fails to take
into consideration cyclical forces whose influences on
the capital account are opposite to their influences on
the current account.” International flows of short-
term capital have become highly sensitive to interest
rate differentials among countries, and have tended
to exercise a powerful influence on short-mn fluctua-
tions in the U.S. balance of payments. As the ac-
companying chart shows, capital account changes
have frequently more than offset current account
changes. The dominance of capital flows has been
especially evident since 1968.
In the first quarter of 1970, our balance-of-payments
deficit, on an official settlements basis, reached a
seasonally adjusted annual rate of $22.1 billion; on a
net liquidity basis the deficit was more than $10.4
billion. These deficits were among the largest ever
recorded, and reflected speculative outflows and a
‘
7
The balance of payments on current account includes all
transactions involving exports and imports of goods and
services and transfer payments. The capital account, as
used here, consists of all private transactions in assets and
liabilities, whether classified in the balance-of-payments as
long-term, short-term, nonliquid or liquid.
very sharp decline in U.S. and Eurodollar interest
rates. Speculative movements of funds may have al-
ready diminished, and if the domestic economy ex-
pands faster than foreign economies, there will be a
rise in domestic interest rates relative to those over-
seas. Short-term rates in the United States have al-
ready risen substantially froni their February lows.
The cyclical upswing in interest rates can be held in
cheek only temporarily by an exceedingly expansive
monetary policy, and such a policy will ultimately
result in even higher interest rates.
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Forces are therefore operating once again to make
short-tern, investment in the United States relatively
attractive to foreigners, and short-term foreign invest-
ment less attractive to Americans. Long-term foreign
investment in the United States, although modest in
comparison with overseas long-term asset acquisitions
by U.S. investors, has also begun to recover from the
low levels of the first half of 1970, If recent perform-
ance is any guide, the favorable swing in the capital
account could outweigh the deterioration of the cur-
rent account, so that the U.S. balance-of-payments
position, on both the official settlements and liquidity
balance basis, might soon improve.
Proposed Alterations to Present
International Monetary Arrangements
The large flow of dollars into foreign central banks,
and the decision to allow the mark to float, touched
off a new round of diagnoses of the problems in
managing the present international monetary system.
These ranged from warnings of the impending col-
lapse of the entire system, to enthusiastic approval of
recent developments as demonstrations of progress
toward greater exchange rate flexibility.
The system being reappraised is the product of
central bank adherence to International Monetary
Fund (IMF) rules. The effect of these rnles has been
(a) to reinforce the United States’ commitment to
redeem on demand in gold at $35 per ounce all
official foreign dollar claims, and (b) to induce other
individual governments, to maintain, for long periods,
fixed parity prices of dollars in terms of their own
currencies. In recent years, foreign central banks, with
few exceptions, have avoided exercising their gold
conversion option.tt A foreign central bank, if it
wishes to continue supporting the price of the dollar
in terms of its own currency at the existing exchange
parity, must be willing to absorb as reserves what-
ever dollars are offered to it, As the “dollar standard”
has evolved, with discretion for monetary growth
lodged in U.S. hands, foreign governments would face
inflationary pressures should U.S. monetary and fiscal
actions persistently take an excessively expansive
course. On the other hand, in the short-mn, dollar
flows may be erratic and create difficult problems of
economic stabilization for foreign governments.
~ has not purchased gold from the U.S. since 1964.
France recently obtained $282 million, but has been a net
seller to the U.S. since 1966. The U.K. has international
financial obligations which make it an unlikely potential
purchaser of geld. Canada, despite strong balance-of-pay-
ments surpluses, has been selling gold as a producer nation,
Japan last bought U.S. gold in 1966. Among major in-
dustnal nations, only the Low Countries and Switzerland
frequently exercise their gold conversion option.
Raise the Dollar Price of Gold?
Foreign reactions to this dilemma have therefore
been directed toward finding viable alternatives to
present international monetary arrangements. One
option advocated at times — devaluation of the dollar
in ternas of gold — has been losing support. Five years
ago, when dollar claims held by foreigners were per-
haps no more than twice as large as the U.S. gold
stock, it was possible to give serious consideration to a
doubling of the dollar price of gold (which would
double the dollar value of our gold stock) as a means
of restoring U.S. ability to meet all dollar claims at a
fixed gold price. No,v that total foreign official and
private liquid dollar claims are more than three times
as large as our gold stock, as shown in Table II, the
required threefold increase in the price of gold is
beyond reason ble probability of adoption.’°The tre-
mendous gai s rom such a change in the official gold
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Since the abandomnent of the London Gold Peel in 1968
and its replacement by the ‘two-tier” gold market, only
foreign central banks have even pro forma rights to pur-
chase gold at the official price of $35 per ounce. All other
demands must be met in the free London gold market.
The “two-tier” system electively eliminated private specn-
lative runs on gold as a source of direct pressure on official
gold reserves. l-lowever, in measuring U.S. dollar liabilities
to foreigners, it should be recognized that insofar as foreign
central banks maintain convertibility of foreign currencies
into dollars at par, dollar liabilities to private foreigners
can readily become liabilities to official agencies. The recent
large scale conversion of Eurodollars into fcmreign currency
is an illustration of this.
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tion. Gold producers would benefit a great deal from
this devaluation; in 1968 South Africa supplied 76.8
per cent of the world’s gold output.
More “Paper Gold”?
Another alternative is to place greater reliance on
paper gold, that is, Special Drawing Rights. A major
criticism of the present system is that dependence on
dollar deficits as a source of additions to international
liquidity is an unreliable and erratic device for con-
trolling growth in the world’s monetary reserves. It
has even been suggested that there is paradox in a
system in which growth in the supply of dollars is
greatest when U.S. balance-of-payments deficits are
the largest. Confidence in the “soundness” of the dol-
lar may then be weakest, As confidence lessens, the
demand for dollars would be reduced. Shifts in the
supply and foreign private demand for dollars as
international currency may be inversely related. This
might tend to magnify domestic instability of countries
that adhere to fixed exchange rates, since their central
banks would be forced to acquire dollars that private
foreigners do not want. The problems of maintaining
control over the domestic money supply in the face of
large dollar flows have been discussed previously,
Under the present tie facto dollar standard, a vari-
ety of emergency credit facilities have been provided
for countries under temporary balance-of-payments
pressure. These arrangements include the following:
(a) currency “swap” agreements, arranged by the
Federal Reserve, which permit the central banks of 14
major countries limited lines of credit to borrow each
other’s currencies for periods up to one year; (b)
IMF quotas which permit members to draw, for pe-
riods up to five years, fund currencies in amounts
equal to their 25 per cent IMF gold contribution
(“tranche”) on demand, and their 75 per cent do-
mestic currency contribution with IMF permission;
and (c) emergency lending commitments of the
“Group of Ten” large trading nations to come to the
aid of countries in liquidity crisis when other credit
facilities are inadequate.
The international monetary system has been
criticized by those who believe that neither the exist-
ing conditions under which dollars are supplied nor
these emergency credit arrangements satisfactorily
provide for stable growth in international liquidity.
For this reason, the expansion of Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs ) 20 and quotas in the IMF has been
20
SDRs are allocated by the IMF to its members. Title to
SDRs can he transferred from one member to another in
exchange for convertible currency, which can then be used
in settlement of balance-of-payments deficits. Each member
country initially receives SDR “allocations” in proportion
to its subscribed quota in the IMF, and agrees to accept
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advocated So far IMF members have agreed to the
allocation of $9.4 billion of SDRs; $3.4 billion were
issued on January 1 1970 and $3 billion each on
January 1, 1971 and 1972 Negotiations on additional
allocations will begin next year
I
Two features of SDRs deserve emphasis. First,
they are intended to substitute for gold as an ultimate
means of settling balance-of-payments deficits, Since
SDRs can be created by a weighted 85 per cent
majority of the voting members of the IMF, shortages
of international liquidity, such as nught arise if gold
production were the only source of new international
reserves, can in principle be eliminated by inter-
national agreement to allocate additional SDRs — a
simple bookkeeping operation.
Secondly, SDRs can substitute for dollars as an
international reserve currency. Instead of being a
fortuitous by-product of U.S. balance-of-payments
deficits, as some critics describe the present situation,
the creation of additional reserve currency can be
made a matter of international planning and agree-
ment on the long-rnn rate of growth of world liquid-
ity. Potentially, the growth in international currency
reserves could be rendered more stable.2’
GreaterFlexibility of Exchange Rates?
Broader recognition of the extent to which present
arrangements based on pegged exchange rates reduce
the monetary autonomy of individual countries has
recently sparked an unprecedented amount of dis-
cussion and experimentation concerning increased
flexibility of exchange rates, West Germany’s decision
to allow the mark to float ii the second in less than
two years. An important prelude to the more recent
of these actions was a unanimous report by five pri-
vate Gennan economic research institutes advocating
additional SDRs (upon request of the IMF, and in ex-
change for its own currency) up to tsviee its own cumulated
SDR allocation. Each member country pays interest on its
cumulated allocation, and receives interest on all SDRs
held. A country whose cumulated allocation exceeds its
holdings of SDRs will be a net payer of interest; one
whose holdings exceeds its allocation will be a net recipient
of interest. See Michael Keran, ‘A Dialogue on Special
Drawing Rights,” this Review (July 1968), pp. 5-7.
2
’Also, each country can share in the seigniorage benefits
of liquidity creation in proportion to its quota in the IME.
These benefits now accrue to the United States insofar as
it is the supplier of reserve currency to the world. Seigniorage
is received if the interest paid to holders of international
reserve assets is less than the monetary yield such holders
could earn on other assets. The interest paid on SDR s is
1.5 per cent per year, which is considerably less than the
average interest paid on dollar claims.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST LOUIS JULY 1971
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that the mark be allowed to float to determine a new
exchange rate — a report which was termed “construe-
tive” by West German Economies Minister Schiller.
The guilder was also allowed to float at the same time
as the mark. In June 1970, Canada returned to a
floating rate, after a lapse of eight years. This year the
U.S. Council of Economic Advisers voiced approval
of “greater flexibility of exchange rates within the
framework of the present system established at Bret-
ton oo”22 Treasury Secretary Connally, in a re.
cent speech in Munich, suggested that consideration
be given to incorporating additional elements of
flexibility of exchange rates into the present system.2m
Against this background, the international financial
community awaits with interest the IMF’s first major
study of floating rates.24
The principal objection to a system of flexible cx-
change rates remains a practical one — it has never
been tried on a sufficiently widespread scale, under
sufficiently nornial worldwide economic conditions,
to justify the claims made for it (or against it). If
progress toward freeing exchange rates is to be made,
22knnual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Economic Report of the President, 1971, p. 145.
2
m5pe~hby John Connally before the International Banking
Conference, Munich, May 28, 1971, as reported in The
American Banker (June 1, 1971 ), p. 16.
24
lnternational Monetary Fund, Annual Report, 1970, p. 14.
it may therefore exolve within the present system
which, despite its wealo~esses.provides a Imown,
agreed-upon organizational and procedural frame-
work.
Two major steps that could be implemented, if
present IMF rules were modified, would be (a) to
widen to as much as 5 per cent, from the present
1 per cent band, the permissible margins around
parity svithin which each country’s exchange rates
could vary; and ( b ) to permit smaller and more
frequent changes in parity levels. Since, even now, the
IMF concurs in parity adjustments whenever these
are necessary to con’ect a “fundamental disequilib-
rum,” the IMF itself could establish criteria that
would encourage such adjustments. For example, al-
though rejected in the past, the IMF might still
adopt the “crawling peg” proposal, under which the
parity level would be a continuously adjustable mov-
ing average of recent past market exchange rates,
appreciating if the currency had previously tended
to sell at its “ceiling” level, and depreciating if it
had tended to sell at its “floor” level.
Measures are being taken or proposed which could
undermine adherance to and support for IMF “adjust-
able peg” policies. Aside from the actions of Canada,
Germany, and the Netherlands, Belgium has modified
its “two-tier” system, so as to maintain a fixed cx-
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change rate on current account transactions, while
pennitting the exchange rate on a wider range of
capital transactions to float. Other countries are re-
ported to be considering similar mneasures. Another
possibility xvould be the coalescing of national cur-
rencies into two or more “key currency” blocs, whose
respective national currencies would exchange at
fixed rates within the bloc, and at fluctuating rates with
respect to currencies in other blocs. The reported
German proposal for a “concerted float” of all EEC
currencies against the dollar is a step in this direction.
A floating rate against the dollar might be required if
a common EEC currency unit and monetary policy,
now planned for 1980, is to be achieved. Alteration of
the IMF’s operating rnles may therefore become nec-
essary if it is to play an influential role in guiding the
future course of international monetary organization.
Stable Monetary Growth and the
Dollar’s Role as a Key Currency
In recent years, the dollar reserves of foreign cen-
tral banks have been subjected to sharp variations,
due to changes in the willingness of private foreigners
to hold dollars. Fluctuations in U.S. interest rates
were largely responsible for these variations in de-
mnand for dollars. These interest rate movements
\vere, in turn, ultimately attributable to wide swings
in the growth rate of the U.S. money supply. As a
result, foreign central banks have found it difficult to
control the growth in their own domestic money
stocks in the face of fluctuations in their dollar re-
serves. Unsteady inflows of dollars under fixed ex-
change rates are viewed by some foreign govern-
ments as a serious impediment to successful pursuit
of their domestic economic stabilization policies.
The 1971 Annual Report of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers asserts that inconsistency of bal-
ance-of-payments goals [among countries] cannOt,
in short, be solved through unilateral policy action
by the United States.” Instead, says the Report, “. ..it
requires multilateral action 1w the members of the
International Monetary Fund.”um Interpreting this
passage broadly, it seems to deny that there is any
policy the United States could alone undertake which
svould provide a fully adequate foundation for a
stable, non-inflationary international monetary system.
The present international position of the dollar as
a reserve currency and liquid asset makes it an
alternative to any reserve currency (such as SDRs)
2m
Economie Report of the President, 1971, p. 151.
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that might be created by international agreement.
In order for the dollar to achieve an acceptable
position as an international reserve currency, how-
ever, two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the pur-
chasing power of the dollar in terms of goods and
services must not he subject to rapid and unpredict-
able erosion that mnight impair its attractiveness as
a liquid asset. Second, the stock of dollars used as
international currency should grow at a stable rate, so
that the dollar reserves of foreign monetary authori-
ties may expand at a reasonably steady rate.
These requirements might appear to pose an exces-
sively burdensome constraint on the exercise of dis-
cretionary power by U.S. monetary authorities. Yet,
there is mounting evidence that efforts at discretion-
ary monetamy management have increased, rather
than reduced, instability of domestic aggregate de-
mand. More often than not, this instability has been
associated with unsuccessful attempts by the Federal
Reserve to manipulate interest rates (or money mar-
ket conditions) instead of concentrating on the pro-
vision of moderate, steady growth in monetary ag-
gregates, such as the money supply. The paradox of
the niore aggressive discretionary “eontracyclical” U.S.
monetary managemnent of the past five years is that it
has produced proeyclical results, including wider fluc-
tuations in monetary growth, interest rates, and final
demand, as ~vell as faster inflation, Insofar as unstable
U.S. monetary growth in the past five years has re-
sulted in increased fluctuations in our interest rates
and economic conditions, relative to those abroad,
the U.S. balance-of-payments position has also fluc-
tuated more widely — especially compared with the
results of the less variable monetary policies of the
previous five years.
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There is no evidence of an inherent conflict be-
tween the goals of a stable noninflationary interna-
tional monetary system and a stable U.S. economy.
Steady. non-inflationaiy growth in the U.S. money
supply would appear to serve both objectives very
effectively. Under such a program of steady monetary
growth, the problem of removing inconsistencies be-
tween other countries’ balance-of-payments policies
and our own, could, xvith justification, be considered
the responsibility of other countries to correct. In-
creased stability’ of the U.S. economy would lessen
U.S. short-term cyclical interest rate fluctuations and
would tend to reduce short-term capital flows now
caused by these interest rate fluctuations. Increased
domestic U.S. price stability would help preserve
the attractiveness of the dollar as a liquid asset.FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS ULY 1971
Under more stable conditions in the United States,
some foreign countries might find it advantageous to
maintain fixed parity values of their currencies in
terms of dollars, The monetary policies of such na-
lions could then be geared to steady expansion of
their domestic money supplies at rates that would
nmintain balance-of-payments equilibrium with the
United States. A pattern of price stability similar to
the United States is very likely to develop in such
countries.
On the other hand, countries that found such ac-
commodation to be difficult or undesirable could
maintain balance-of-payments equilibrium and pur-
sue independent monetary policies by permitting the
exchange value of theft currencies, relative to the
dollar, to adjust freely in the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Yet, even for such countries, the very stability
of U.S. monetary growth would foster an interna-
tional monetary environment less subject to external
shocks and uncertainty. There would therefore be
little reason to expect the policies of the United
States to be conducive to widely fluctuating ex-
change rates. There would be still less reason for such
countries to resort to direct controls on capital or
current account transactions to protect their domestic
economy from the effects of U.S. policy on the world
economy.
In the view of many of its proponents, the funda-
mental appeal of the gold standard was the protec-
tion it afforded against rapid inflation, and the auto-
matic mechanism it provided for expansion of the
world money supply through new gold production.
Before World War I, the great financial prestige of
the United Kingdom supported the gold standard.
No multilateral negotiations were necessary — each
country adopted the gold standard or abstained, as
it saw fit. The maintenance of a steady, moderate
rate of monetary growth by the United States can
offer the advantages of a gold standard more reliably
and at less cost in real resources. Moreover, such a
“dollar standard” could, through voluntary and piece-
meal adaptation by individual nations, become the
basis for a stable international monetary system, with-
out the negotiations, stalemates, compromises, and
makeshift agreements that inevitably accompany mul-
tilateral efforts to reform the present system.
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